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This Article directly challenges the often argued proposition that Ger-
many’s two-tier board of directors is superior to America’s single-tier
board structure.  It argues that regardless of structure, any decision-making
body that lacks effective decision-making processes is at signifcant risk of
failure, scandal, and ineffectiveness.  Legal scholars and policymakers have
largely ignored the connection between decision-making processes and the
efficacy of corporate leadership.  The Article is the first to examine this
underexplored relationship in the context of the German dual-board.
Volkswagen’s 2015 emissions scandal provides a vehcicle to critcally
assess the relationship between Germany’s two-tiered board and an effec-
tive decision-making process.  This Article argues that the structure of
Volkwagen’s dual board did not automatically result in an effective deci-
sion-making processes.  Additionally, an effective decision-making pro-
cess—the attributes of which can be found in organizational behavior
theory—is essential to helping German boards accomplish their legislative
mandate.  Moreover, it is essential to helping the boards of transnational
corporations, which have a wide range of structural variations, effectively
govern the organizations for whom they work.
In sum, Volkswagen and other German corporations may follow the
structural requirements of German corporate law, but without effective
processes, German directors are likely to fail in their monitoring and su-
pervisory roles.  Without effective processes, directors are watchers asleep
at their post, uninformed, dormant, and ineffective in preventing gross fail-
ures of corporate integrity.  Unless German boards adopt and implement a
Process-Oriented Approach, the Volkswagen emission scandal will simply
be another mark on a timeline for a century plagued by corporate failure.
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INTRODUCTION
The Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal sounds like the plot to a
Hollywood blockbuster movie: In an effort to evade the law, senior execu-
tives at one of the world’s oldest and most recognized automobile corpora-
tions install sophisticated software in over 11 million of its vehicles.  The
software allows the vehicles to appear environmentally compliant, when in
fact, they are illegally spewing toxic, possibly deadly, pollutants into the
atmosphere.  Scientists from a small lab in West Virginia suspect the de-
ception.  Over the course of several years, these scientists confirm that the
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company was cheating on emissions testing through the use of “defeat de-
vices.”  Their discovery brings the corporate behemoth and its powerful
executives to their knees.  The company’s stock price plummets.  The de-
ception, which was intended to catapult the company into the top spot in
the automobile industry, backfires, costing the company over $30 billion in
fines and vehicle buybacks.1  The CEO and other high-ranking executives
are forced to resign, and the company’s reputation is irrecoverably
damaged.
Although it may sound like excellent fiction, it is a frighteningly accu-
rate synopsis of the largest scandal in the automobile industry’s history.2
Recent developments continue to confirm the Volkswagen tale is far from
finished.  In January 2017, the FBI arrested Oliver Schmidt, a German citi-
zen who served as Volkswagen’s manager for its Michigan-based environ-
mental and engineering office.  Schmidt, a 48-year-old German citizen,
pled guilty to charges related to the admission scandal.  On December 6,
2017, a Federal District Court in Detroit sentenced Mr. Schmidt to seven
years in prison and fined him $400,000 for conspiracy to defraud the fed-
eral government and for violating the Clean Air Act.3  The same court
sentenced James Liang, a Volkswagen engineer, to a 40 month prison sen-
tence for his role in emissions scandal.4
While Volkswagen’s defeat devices5 may have been a surprise to many,
the usual suspect—the board of directors—shouldered the blame.  When
1. See generally Paul A. Eisenstein, Volkswagen Slapped with Largest Ever Fine for
Automakers, NBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/judge-ap
proves-largest-fine-u-s-history-volkswagen-n749406.
2. Guilbert Gates, Jack Ewing, Karl Russell & Derek Watkins, Explaining Volk-
swagen’s Emissions Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interac
tive/2015/ business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-explained.html?_r=0; Margot
Sanger-Katz & John Schwartz, How Many Deaths Did Volkswagen’s Deception Cause in the
U.S.?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/upshot/how-many-
deaths-did-volkswagens-deception-cause-in-us.html. See also Clive Irving, Revealed: How
VW Designed the Greatest Scandal in Automotive History, DAILY BEAST (July 19, 2016, 10:25
AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/revealed-how-vw-designed-the-greatest-scandal-in-auto
motive-history.
3. Bill Vlasic, Volkswagen Official Gets 7-Year Term in Diesel-Emissions Cheating,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/business/oliver-schmidt-volks
wagen.html.
4. Eric D. Lawrence, VW Engineer Gets 40 Months in Prison for Role in Diesel Scan-
dal, USA TODAY (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2017/08/25/
vw-engineer-gets-40-months-prison-role-diesel-scandal/602584001/ (“In addition to his prison
sentence, Liang was ordered to serve two years of supervised release and pay a $200,000 fine.
He is to be deported after his sentence.”).
5. 40 C.F.R § 86.004-2 (2016) (“Defeat device means an auxiliary emission control
device (AECD) that reduces the effectiveness of the emission control system under condi-
tions which may reasonably be expected to be encountered in normal vehicle operation and
use, unless: (1) Such conditions are substantially included in the Federal emission test proce-
dure . . . (2) The need for the AECD is justified in terms of protecting the vehicle against
damage or accident; (3) The AECD does not go beyond the requirements of engine starting;
or (4) The AECD applies only for engines that will be installed in emergency vehicles . . . .”;
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corporations fail or scandals surface, there is a refrain, like the chorus of a
well-known song, which fills the airwaves: Where was the board?  The
board failed to monitor managers.  The board lacked independence.  This
refrain was heard over and over again after most of the well-known fail-
ures of this century—Enron, World Com, Adelphi, Merrill Lynch, and
AIG—to name a few.6  Volkswagen is no exception.  The company’s
shocking admission that it had systematically cheated on years of emis-
sions tests through the use of sophisticated “defeat devices” dominated
news headlines and shook the foundation of one of the world’s largest and
oldest corporations.  Within days of the admission, Volkswagen’s stock
price dropped by more than half and led many financial experts to suggest
that the company might never recover.
The question remained: How could such a long term and meticulously
executed deception have occurred?  Articles in the Financial Times and
The Wall Street Journal cite the company’s poor corporate governance as a
“root cause of the diesel-emissions scandal.”7  The Volkswagen Supervi-
sory Board was criticized because it lacked “diversity, expertise, and
independence.”8
Volkswagen is a German company, organized with a dual-tier struc-
ture.  Germany’s two-tier board structure is often considered superior to
American corporations’ unitary boards.9  The dominant theory of United
States corporations’ purpose is shareholder wealth maximization.  This is
distinct from the theory that informs German boards.  The German two-
tier model is in many ways a reflection of stakeholder primacy,
see generally Criminal Complaint ¶ 49, United States v. Schmidt, No. 16-mj-30588 (E.D.
Mich. filed Dec. 30, 2016).
6. See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the De-
clining Significance of Federal Reforms on State Director Independence Standards, 31 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 381, 382–83 (2005) (“Indeed, corporate governance scandals suggested that
directors had failed to appropriately monitor corporate officers, and that such failure enabled
officers to engage in fraud and other behavior detrimental to shareholders and the markets in
general.”); Allan D. Grody, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009, at MM28 (stating
that the financial crisis was properly blamed on “lack of management oversight and dili-
gence”); Ben Stein, It’s Time to Act Like Grown-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, at 4 (won-
dering where the directors were when banks such as Merrill Lynch faced financial disaster);
Ralph Ward, Editorial, CEOs Got Grilled, but Let’s Hear from Board Leaders, Too, DE-
TROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 10, 2008, at 15 (“All our corporate disasters of the past decade, from
Enron up to the current financial meltdown, have drawn the same question: Where was the
board?”).
7. See, e.g., Chris Bryant & Richard Milne, Boardroom Politics at the Heart of VW
Scandal, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e816cf86-6815-11e5-a57f-
21b88f7d973f.html#axzz48h2iiM7s.
8. Id.
9. See generally Tien Glaub, Lessons From Germany: Improving on the U.S. Model
for Corporate Governance, 5 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 235 (2009); Cherie J. Owen,
Board Games: Germany’s Monopoly on the Two-Tier System of Corporate Governance and
Why the Post-Enron United States Would Benefit from its Adoption, 22 PA. ST. INT’L L. REV.
167 (2003).
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codetermination, and managerialism.10  The defining principle of Ger-
many’s board management is codetermination; codetermination is a prin-
cipal that seeks to balance capital, shareholder wealth, and the needs of
employees, including organized labor.11  In American corporate govern-
ance parlance, it would be called “stakeholder wealth maximization” in-
stead of “shareholder wealth maximization.”  Despite this theoretical
distinction, this Article argues that German corporate boards are suscepti-
ble to the same shortcomings as American boards.  The ideal of
codetermination is easily subsumed by greed and wealth maximization
when proper process is not prioritized.
A look underneath the hood reveals that despite the dual-tier structure
of Volkswagen’s board, the process employed was grossly inadequate.  My
earlier work developed a novel Process-Oriented Approach (“POA”) for
decision-making.12  I have argued that process is more important than
structure for boards of directors, like Volkswagen’s, to be effective.13  This
approach has clearly identified the specific attributes of a decision-making
process that are essential to sound governance.  This Article uses that
foundation to provide an innovate analysis of one of the most significant
corporate governance failures in history, the Volkswagen emissions
scandal.
Many policy makers, corporate governance advocates, and scholars
have argued that Germany’s dual-board structure promotes codetermina-
tion and allows for a wide-range of views to shape corporate strategy.14
Consequently, these policy makers argue that it is a superior monitoring
mechanism to the single-tier board used in the United States because the
members of the two-tier board have a vested interest in seeing their views
10. David Block & Anne-Marie Gerstner, One-Tier vs. Two-Tier Board Structure: A
Comparison Between the United States and Germany (Spring 2016) (unpublished seminar
paper, University of Pennsylvania Law School) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Law School Legal Scholarship Repository).
11. Rebecca Page, Co-Determination in Germany: A Beginner’s Guide, ARBEIT-
SPAPIER 33, HANS BOECKLER FOUND. at 10-11 (June 2009), https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/
p_arbp_033.pdf; see also Lutz Englisch & Mark Zimmer, The Future of German
Codetermination, BUS. L. MAGAZINE (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.businesslaw-magazine.com/
2016/09/08/the-future-of-german-codetermination/.
12. See, e.g., Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process Over Structure: An Organizational Behavior
Approach to Improving Corporate Boards, 85 SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. 261 (2012).
13. See id.
14. ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS § 347:30, Westlaw
(database updated Jan. 2018) (“While protections for minority shareholders in Germany
were characterized as ‘weak’ large holders of shares were given seats on the Supervisory
Board where they could exert control and closely monitor management activities and pursue
their strategic interests with respect to the firm; Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corpo-
rate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 967 (1984) (“Codetermination seeks by its structur-
ing of the board to implement cohesive and harmonious employer-employee relationships
. . . . More practically, the primary benefit of codetermination is said to be an absence or
lessening of labor unrest, which fosters the social cohesion and stability emphasized by cor-
poratism.”) (citations omitted).
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heard and in understanding the company’s business decisions.  This Article
shows that a dual-board structure is subject to the same shortcomings seen
in U.S. corporations when it is not used in conjunction with the type of
process that leads groups to make sound and well-informed decisions.  The
Article applies the foundational attributes of an effective decision-making
process to show why a two-tiered board without these attributes leaves the
corporation vulnerable to gross malfeasance and managerial failure.15  An
analysis of Volkswagen reveals that there were numerous process failures
at Volkswagen and suggests ways that all boards, regardless of structure,
can use a process-oriented approach to detect, deter, and defend against
malfeasance and corruption.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I examines the timeline of
events leading up to September 2015, when Volkswagen admitted to in-
stalling defeat devices, and the subsequent admission in November 2015.
Part II provides an overview of German corporations’ two-tier corporate
governance structure, with a specific examination of Volkswagen’s struc-
ture.  It identifies the laws that dictated Volkswagen’s board structure and
discusses the animating theory of codetermination.  This foundation is nec-
essary to understand how Volkswagen’s two-tiered board failed.  Part III
analyzes how Volkswagen’s Supervisory Board failed to fulfill its monitor-
ing responsibility.  It argues that the Supervisor Board was a cosmetic fea-
ture of Volkswagen’s governance structure and that it lacked the
substantive knowledge or information to meaningfully monitor.  Part IV
applies the Process-Oriented Approach.  It shows that Volkswagen lacked
an effective decision-making process which allowed both for blatant fraud
to run rampant and for watchdogs, including many of the Supervisory
Board directors, to lie dormant and ignorant while the deception took root
and grew.  In order to understand how Volkswagen’s decision-making pro-
cess was suboptimal, this Part will closely analyze the decisions made both
at the board and at senior management levels.  In all, the Volkswagen
board failed to establish the type of decision-making process that would
have helped to identify the corruption that led to the emissions scandal.
This Part goes on to discuss alternatives drawn from the POA that may
help corporations like Volkswagen in the future. Part V concludes.
I. DEFEAT DEVICES, DECISIONS, AND EMISSIONS
In September 2015, Volkswagen (VW) shocked the world when it ad-
mitted that it had installed “defeat device” software in almost half a mil-
lion of its cars sold in the U.S. and more than 11 million vehicles
globally.16  The software avoided detection by the automobiles’ emission
15. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the attributes of an effective decision making
process).
16. Jeff Plungis & Dana Hull, VW’s Emissions Cheating Found by Curious Clear-Air
Group, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-19/
volkswagen-emissions-cheating-found-by-curious-clean-air-group [https://perma.cc/AS8M-
69KH].
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control system when it “bypasse[d], defeat[ed], or render[ed] inoperative
elements” of the system in order to avoid emissions testing.17  As a result,
Volkswagen’s diesel-powered vehicles emitted high levels of nitrogen ox-
ides and fine particulates that are harmful to children or individuals with
respiratory disease.18  Their admission followed a September 18, 2015 U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) Notice of Violation to Volk-
swagen AG, Audi AG, and Volkswagen Group of America (“VW”) con-
cluding that Volkswagen had manufactured and installed defeat devices in
certain light-duty diesel vehicles equipped with 2.0 liter engines from 2009-
2015.19
Volkswagen’s stock plummeted 37% in the 48 hours following their
admission.20  The company’s loss will be extensive.  Costs from the viola-
tions and vehicle recalls have already exceeded $30 billion.21  The defeat
devices were not an isolated incident that led to an unexpected failure to
follow the law.  Instead, it was a well-researched, intentional, and con-
certed effort by Volkswagen’s leadership to increase sales and to grow
their market share.
One might ask: How could a well-known company such as Volkswagen
carry out a multi-year deception?  Many commentators have been quick to
identify the Volkswagen Supervisory Board’s lack of authority and poor
monitoring of the Management Board and Volkswagen’s executives as
causes.22  This Part of the Article examines the timeline of events leading-
up to the September realization that Volkswagen had cheated on emission
tests.  This Part, furthermore, studies the Volkswagen incident to illustrate
why Germany’s two-tier board is subject to many of the same limitations
of American corporate boards.  The timeline of events shows that the
structure of the Supervisory Board lacked the necessary safeguards to
17. Letter from Phillip A. Brooks, Dir., Air Enf’t Div., Office of Civil Enf’t, Envtl.
Prot. Agency, to David Geanacopoulos, Exec. Vice Pres. Pub. Affairs and Gen. Counsel,
Volkswagen Grp. Of Am., Inc., and Stuart Johnson, Gen. Manager, Eng’g and Envtl. Office,
Volkswagen Grp. Of Am., Inc. (Sept. 18, 2015) (on file with E&E News) http://www.eenews
.net/assets/2015/09/21/ document_cw_01.pdf [hereinafter Notice of Violation].
18. Susan Carpenter, Based on Academic Research, Volkswagen Emissions Scam
Could have Killed More than a Hundred, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www
.ocregister.com/articles/health-685158-air-california.html [https://perma.cc/4QTV-BJQK].
19. See NOTICE OF VIOLATION, supra note 17 (Volkswagen specifically violated
§§ 203(a)(3)(B) and 203(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (42 USC §§ 7522(a)(3)(B) and
7522(a)(1), respectively).
20. Richard Milne, Volkswagen: System Failure, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www
.ft.com/cms/s/2/47f233f0-816b-11e5-a01c-8650859a4767.html.
21. Eisenstein, supra note 1; Timothy Gardner & Bernie Woodall, Volkswagen Could
Face $18 Billion Penalties from EPA, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/us-usa-volkswagen-idUSKCN0RI1VK20150918 [https://perma.cc/LL68-VMW7].
22. See Keith Ferrazi, Volkswagen’s Fatal Flaw: Its Corporate Structure, LINKEDIN
(Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/volkswagens-fatal-flaw-its-corporate-struc
ture-keith-ferrazzi [https://perma.cc/4M57-AC9T]; Charles M. Elson, Craig K. Ferrere &
Nicholas J. Goossen, The Bug at Volkswagen: Lessons in Co-Determination, Ownership, and
Board Structure, 27 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 36 (2015).
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make it effective.  More importantly, the Supervisory Board did not have
an effective decision-making process.
A. Timeline of Events23
Volkswagen’s 2015 admission was not the first time it had cheated the
U.S. EPA by installing defeat devices.  In 1973, Volkswagen was fined
$120,000 by the EPA for installing defeat devices to shut down their vehi-
cle’s emissions systems.24  The 1973 violation was a clear indication that
defeat devices were a violation of the law.  Additionally, in 1998 a diesel
truck-engine manufacturer settled a suit with the EPA for $1 billion for the
same violation Volkswagen committed in 2015.25  While Volkswagen was
not part of the 1998 suit, the suit should have served as an obvious indica-
tor of the consequences following intentional installation of software
programmed to fake test technology relating to a vehicle’s pollution con-
trol system.
It appears that Volkswagen contemplated the installation of defeat de-
vices as early as May 2006.26  In 2007, the company moved to software
based technology to manage emissions controls.27  At the same time, the
company had ambitions to increase U.S. market share.  From a practical
standpoint, that meant Volkswagen needed to manufacture bigger vehicles
that appealed to American consumers but also complied with the Obama
Administration’s increasingly strict mileage standards.28
Volkswagen’s strategy for achieving such paradoxical results utilized
diesel engines that offered better mileage.29  Unfortunately for Volk-
swagen, diesel engines also emit more harmful emissions.  This increase in
harmful emissions created a separate problem for Volkswagen with the
U.S. environmental regulations on acceptable levels of emissions.30  In ad-
dition, American standards were stricter than European standards.31
The defeat device software solved Volkswagen’s problems.  These de-
vices saved Volkswagen from having to develop and to install more costly
emissions reduction technology.  False compliance with acceptable levels
of emissions gave owners better mileage and performance.  Volkswagen
used its false compliance with emissions numbers to present an image of
23. Volkswagen Interim Report, Jan.-Sept. 2015, VOLKSWAGEN (Oct. 28, 2015), https://
www.volkswagenag.com/presence/investorrelation/publications/interim-reports/2015/volkswa
gen/englisch/Q3_2015_e.pdf.
24. Danny Hakim, Aaron M. Kessler & Jack Ewing, As Volkswagen Pushed to be No.
1, Ambitions Fueled a Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
09/27/business/as-vw-pushed-to-be-no-1-ambitions-fueled-a-scandal.html.
25. Id.
26. See Criminal Complaint, supra note 5, at 4.
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engines so pure that they were given angel’s wings in a Volkswagen Super
Bowl commercial.32
Volkswagen used the defeat devices in engines over a seven year pe-
riod in the 2009-2016 model years.  According to the complaint, West Vir-
ginia University’s Center for Alternative Fuels & Emissions questioned
Volkswagen’s representatives about the elevated emissions levels in two
categories of vehicles: (1) those equipped with 2.0L diesel engines and (2)
those with 3.0L diesel engines.33  When questioned, Volkswagen misrepre-
sented the truth.34  The company even asserted that “regulators were not
doing the testing properly.”35  Volkswagen claimed that the high in-use
emissions levels “were attributable to various yet-to-be identified technical
issues.”36
The company has since admitted that then CEO Winterkorn was sent a
memo in May 2014 with details that some Volkswagen vehicles had nitro-
gen oxide emissions that were 35 times greater than permitted.37  The
memo informed Winterkorn of the West Virginia study.38  Volkswagen,
however, claims that they do not know if Winterkorn took notice of the
May 2014 memo.39  On November 14, 2015, he was sent another memo
that covered several issues including “a cost framework of approx[imately]
EUR 20 million for the diesel issue in North America.”40  Despite this
information, Volkswagen informed regulators that they could optimize the
vehicles’ software to address the excess emissions problem and authorized
two recalls for the 2.0L engine vehicles in December 2014 and March 2015
for some of the vehicles affected.41  In July 2015, according to the FBI’s
criminal complaint against Oliver Schmidt, Volkswagen’s executive man-
32. See id.
33. See WVU Study Found Elevated Levels of Emissions from Volkswagen Vehicles,
W. VA. UNIV. (Sept. 24, 2015), http://wvutoday-archive.wvu.edu/n/2015/09/24/wvu-study-
found-elevated-levels-of-emissions-from-volkswagen-vehicles.html; Guilbert Gates, Jack Ew-
ing, Karl Russell & Derek Watkins, How Volkswagen’s ‘Defeat Devices’ Worked, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/vw-diesel-
emissions-scandal-explained.html?smid=pl-share; DR. GREGORY J. THOMPSON ET AL., FINAL
REPORT: IN-USE EMISSIONS TESTING OF LIGHT-DUTY DIESEL VEHICLES IN THE UNITED
STATES (2014), https://www.cafee.wvu.edu/files/d/843c9c22-dfb4-4901-a6ec-68943652924a/
wvu_lddv_in-use_icct_report_final_may2014.pdf. See also Complaint ¶¶ 56, 60, and 85,
United States v. Volkswagen AG, No. 16-cv-10006-LJM-MJH (E.D. Mich. filed Jan. 4, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/809826/download [hereinafter Complaint].
34. See id. at ¶¶ 87, 93-95.
35. See Hakim et al., supra note 24.
36. Complaint, supra note 33, at ¶ 87.
37. Rupert Neate, VW CEO Was Told About Emissions Crisis a Year Before Admit-





41. Complaint, supra note 33, at ¶ 88.
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agement was informed of the defeat device and authorized the continued
cover-up.42
While Volkswagen was aware of the issue, it continued to deny that
there was in fact a problem with its cars.  During this time, the California
Air Resources Board (CARB) along with the EPA conducted indepen-
dent testing into Volkswagen’s high emissions levels to examine the re-
call’s effectiveness.43  Contrary to Volkswagen’s promises, the recalled
vehicles showed only a limited reduction in emissions levels.  Puzzlingly,
the real world driving conditions yielded different results than did emis-
sion in a simulated environment.44  Volkswagen continued to attribute the
test results to technical issues and to particular in-use conditions.45
In fact, Volkswagen concealed facts that would have revealed the de-
feat device and lied to investigators.46  It was not until almost a year later,
in September 2015, after the EPA issued its September 18, 2016 Notice of
Violation to Volkswagen, that Volkswagen admitted the recalled 2.0L ve-
hicles contained a defeat device.47  The device contained a software al-
gorithm(s) that detected when the vehicle was “undergoing emission
testing.”48
Despite the September Notice of Violation and subsequent admission,
Volkswagen did not admit to installing similar devices in the 3.0L engine
vehicles.  In fact, when the EPA issued a second Notice of Violation on
November 2, 2015 pertaining to 3.0L vehicles, Volkswagen “immediately
issued a statement denying that” a defeated device had been installed.49  It
took three weeks for Volkswagen to admit that the 3.0L vehicles contained
such devices.50
Volkswagen’s two-tier structure was intended to prevent such wide-
spread fraud and rampant disregard for the law.  Yet, it did not.  To under-
stand why it failed, it is necessary to have an understanding of what the
two-tier board is and what it was meant to accomplish.  This information is
addressed in Part II.
42. Theo Leggett, VW Papers Shed Light on Emissions Scandal, BBC NEWS (Jan. 12,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-38603723.
43. See Complaint, supra note 33, ¶ 88.
44. Id. at ¶ 89.
45. See id. at ¶ 90.
46. Id. at ¶ 93 (“VW entities including at  least Volkswagen AG knowingly concealed
facts that would have revealed the existence of the dual-calibration strategy utilized in the
2.0L Subject Vehicles to regulators when they had a duty to share such information, and also
engaged in affirmative misrepresentations and took affirmative actions designed to conceal
these facts.”).
47. Id. at ¶ 91.
48. Id.
49. Id. at ¶¶ 97-98.
50. Id. at ¶ 99.
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II. GERMAN TWO-TIER BOARD
German stock corporations separate their boards of directors into two-
tiers: (1) Supervisory Board (“SB”) (Aufsichtsrat) tier and (2) Manage-
ment Board (“MB”) (Vorstand) tier.  The two-tier board is mandated
under German law and applies to all German stock corporations.51  While
the structural differences between the American unitary board and Ger-
man two-tier board are easily observed, the corporate governance theories
that inform each type of structure vary in the stated purpose of the corpo-
ration. 52  American corporations are organized with the primary purpose
of maximizing shareholder wealth.53  German corporations, following a
system of codetermination, are thought to follow a “stakeholder” theory
of the corporation.54
Specifically, codetermination weighs and values the interests of share-
holders, executive management, and other employees, and thus, goes be-
yond merely maximizing shareholder wealth.55  The theory of
codetermination is embodied in the two-tier German board.  This struc-
ture which consists of a Supervisory Board and a Management/Executive
Board is intendent to protect the interest of workers and other stakehold-
ers.  This theory of codetermination is nearly impossible to operationalize
when the representatives on the Supervisory Board are ill-informed or not
informed at all of the Management Board’s decisions and policies.  Part II
delves into the German legal foundation for the two-tier board, specifi-
cally, the theory of codetermination.  It sets the stage for understanding
how the theory easily failed at Volkswagen.
A. German Corporate Governance Laws
Volkswagen uses a complicated governance and ownership structure.
There are multiple regulations governing German business leaders.  These
include laws that enable the creation of various types of corporations and
laws mandating the composition of the boards running those firms.  Ger-
man governance code flows from four major laws: The German Stock Cor-
poration Act (Aktiengesetz),56 the German Codetermination Act
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz), the German Corporate Governance Code, and
the German Act on Employee Involvement in a European Company
51. DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX [DCGK] [GERMAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CODE], § 1, translation at http://www.dcgk.de/en/code//foreword.html (Ger.).
52. See Jens C. Dammann, The Future of Codetermination After Centros: Will German
Corporate Law Move Closer to the U.S. Model?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 607, 607-09
(2003).
53. Id. at 607.
54. See Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corpo-
rate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 356-57 (2011).
55. Dammann, supra note 52, at 608-09.
56. Fundamentals of German Corporate Governance, SGL GROUP, https://perma-
archives.org/warc/82KD-6RPE (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
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(“SEBG”).57  The final of these dictates the practices of a Societas
Europaea (“SE”).58  Although such organizations organize under the laws
of the European Union, Germany exerts an element of control for their
operation within Germany.
1. German Stock Corporation Act
Volkswagen is an Aktiengesellschaft, meaning that it an entity created
under the German Stock Corporation Act.  Administrative power and
composition of German firms depends on the initial organization of the
firm.  This initial organization can take three primary forms under the
German Stock Corporation Act.  These three distinct corporate forms are
as follows: Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung (“GmbH”), similar to
the closed corporation; Volkswagen’s Aktiengesellschaft (“AG”), which is
a stock corporation; and Societas Europaea (“SE”), a transnational Euro-
pean based corporation.59
The modern form of the law is known as the Aktiengesetz von 1965 or
Sharelaw of 1965.60  This is the code that mandates the creation of a bifur-
cated board: the Aufsichtsrat and Vorstand or the Supervisory and Man-
agement board.61  Specifically, section 119 of the law enumerates many of
the basic provisions governing German Corporations, including the
“Rights of The Stockholder Meeting.”  This provision gives broad discre-
tion to whatever the company lists in its articles of incorporation and func-
tions as the main avenue for investor input and grievances.62  The law
57. Id.
58. See Jochem Reichert, Experience with the SE in Germany, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 22,
23-24 (2008) (The SE represents the only type of transnational corporation available in Eu-
rope, including Germany. Volkswagen chose not to become an SE.).
59. See Franck Chantayan, An Examination of American and German Corporate Law
Norms, 16 SAINT JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431, 434-35 (2002); see also Cornelius Wilk,
U.S. Corporation Going European?—The One-Tier Societas Europaea (SE) in Germany, 35
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 31, 104 (2012).
60. Florian Stamm, A Comparative Study of Monitoring of Management in German
and U.S. Corporations After Sarbanes-Oxley: Where are the German Enrons, WorldComs,
and Tycos?, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 813, 818-19 (2004).
61. See id. at 819.
62. AKTIENGESETZ [AKTG] [STOCK CORPORATION ACT], §119, translation at http://
www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/147034/german-stock-corporation-act-
aktiengesetz (Ger.) (“1.The appointment of members of the Supervisory Board, to the extent
they are not to be appointed to the Supervisory Board or be elected as representatives of
employees pursuant to the Codetermination act, the Supplemental Co-determination act, the
One-Third Co-determination Act or the Act on Employee Co-determination within Cross-
border Mergers; 2. The appropriation of distributable profits; 3. The ratification of the acts of
the members of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board; 4. the [annual] appoint-
ment of an auditor; 5. amendments to the articles; 6. measures to increase or reduce the share
capital; 7. the appointment of auditors for the examination of the matters in connection with
the formation or the management of the company; 8. the dissolution of the company. (2) The
shareholders’ meeting may decide on matters concerning the management of the company
only if required by the Management Board.”). See also JOACHIM H BORGGRÄFE ET AL.,
BUSINESS LAWS OF GERMANY: CHAPTER 8 COMPANY TAX LAW § 8.49 (May 2012), https://
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provides that the stockholders may assert their rights to control the funda-
mental policies of the company without interfering with its day-to-day op-
eration.  Stockholders can also declare dividends.63  German corporations
generally must adhere to a national set of rules, with little state level cor-
porate law.64
2. German Codetermination Act
Codetermination represents an important and defining principle of
German board management.  Codetermination laws contain a broad set of
regulations.  The regulations provide for organized labor to sit on the
Management Board and empowers their views in decision-making.  Ulti-
mately, the regulations create a balance to capital and consider the needs
of the employees.65  Germany created several forms of codetermination—
the 1976 Codetermination Law affects companies employing more than
2,000 employees.66  The law states that no overlap is allowed between
boards.67  Members may be removed for material cause and/or through a
supermajority vote.68  Other codetermination laws depend on the size of
the firm and impose similar requirements of labor input.
Codetermination laws create five possible compositions of the Supervi-
sory Board, depending on the required input of various parties in the
firm.69  The board generally includes three or four multiples of three
members, based on the firm’s capital.  While some shareholders may ap-
point members, and the articles of incorporation may change the board’s
composition, most public companies contain a maximum of twenty-one
board members; they serve five year positions with re-election.70
1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I7540447c257d11dfbd6bdb10f7886766/View/FullText.html?ori
ginationContext=previousnextsection&contextData=(sc.Document)&transitionType=Statute
Navigator&needToInjectTerms=False (“The legal power of the shareholders of a public stock
corporation is exercised at regular shareholders’ general meetings (Hauptversammlung).”).
63. Stamm, supra note 60, at 821.
64. Chantayan, supra note 59, at 436.
65. See generally Stamm, supra note 60, at 821.
66. Id. at 823.
67. AKTIENGESETZ [AKTG] [STOCK CORPORATION ACT], § 105(1) Incompatibility of
Management and Supervisory Board Membership, translation at http://www.nortonroseful-
bright.com/files/german-stock-corporation-act-147035.pdf (Ger.) (“A member of the Super-
visory Board may not also be a member of the Management Board, a permanent deputy
member of the Management Board, a registered authorised officer (Prokurist) or general
manager of the company.”).
68. AKTIENGESETZ [AKTG] [STOCK CORPORATION ACT], § 103 Removal of Members
of the Supervisory Board, translation at http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/german-
stock-corporation-act-147035.pdf (Ger.).
69. Stamm, supra note 60, at 821.
70. Id.; see also Peter Steffen Carl et al., Corporate Governance and Directors’ Duties
in Germany: Overview, Practical Law Country Q&A 8-502-1574, https://content.next.westlaw
.com/Document/I9fb3f7b51cac11e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html?contextData=(sc
.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bhcp=1.
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3. Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (“DCGK”)
The Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, the German corporate
governance code (the Code or “DCGK”) provides responsible corporate
governance guidelines and standards for AGs.71  A commission
(Regierungskommission) reviews the code annually and revises it if
necessary.72
The DCGK is non-binding, but the executives of AGs, nonetheless,
must explain their total or partial derivation from the code and must ex-
plain why they made their decision.  The “declarations of conformity”
does not have legal implications, but the boards must make the content of
the declaration public73 and can be liable for deviations to shareholders.74
4. The Volkswagen Law
The Volkswagen Law best represents the central role Volkswagen
played in the economy of Lower Saxony and Germany at large.  The Volk-
swagen law prevented any organization from exercising more than 20% of
the voting rights of Volkswagen regardless of the actual number of shares
owned; for example, the lower state of Saxony’s 20.2% voting interest had
an effective veto right and in 2015 could exert control and could prevent
takeover attempts.75  In 2007, EU Tribunal prohibited Germany from en-
forcing certain elements of the law, including the 20% voting provision;
however, Volkswagen responded by changing its charter in 2009 to give
employees and the state of Saxony certain veto powers of plant closure
and of employee firings.  The Volkswagen law still required an 80%
supermajority of votes to proceed with “important decisions,” preserving
the state’s continued veto element.76  Since Porsche SE expanded its hold-
ings to greater than 50% of the company, the board functions as a private
family owned business with a state government veto power, instead of as
an independent and diverse corporation.77
71. DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX, supra note 51.
72. Carl et al., supra note 70.
73. DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX, supra note 51 (Declarations of
conformity “have to be explained and disclosed with the annual declaration of conformity”).
74. See Axel Werder et al., Compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code:
an empirical analysis of the compliance statements by German listed companies, 13 CORP.
GOV. 178 (2005); Francesca Cuomo et al., Corporate Governance Codes: A Review and Re-
search Agenda, 24 CORP. GOV. INT’L R. 222 (2016).
75. See Stephanie Bodoni, Germany Wins EU Court Battle Over VW Law, Escapes
Fines, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2013, 6:40 AM EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2013-10-22/germany-wins-eu-court-fight-over-vw-law-legality-escapes-fines [https://perma.cc/
M73X-2C4W].
76. See Matina Sevis, EU To Sue Germany Again Over “Volkswagen Law”, WALL ST.
JOURNAL (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702046309045770577
30270544356 [https://perma.cc/2JPL-6B4H].
77. Charles M. Elson, Craig K. Ferrere & Nicholas J. Goossen, The Bug at Volk-
swagen, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 8, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/04/08/
the-bug-at-volkswagen/. (noting that “[T]he Porsche and Piëch families control 50.7% of the
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B. The Structure of a German Board
As mentioned above, the German Stock Corporation Act of 1965 man-
dates Germany’s dual board structure for all stock corporations that are
organized as AGs.78  Pursuant to the Act, the Volkswagen’s board struc-
ture incorporates both tiers: (1) Supervisory Board (“SB”) (Aufsichtsrat)
tier and (2) Management Board (“MB”) (Vorstand) tier.79
1. Supervisory Board
The Supervisory Board represents the higher of the two German
boards in its dual-board structure and role.  The Supervisory Board func-
tions much like an American corporation’s board of directors.  Like the
American unitary board, it is thought to be the primary mechanism by
which managers are monitored.80  It has been described as performing a
“ ‘watch dog’ function to prevent serious abuses.”81  As has traditionally
been the case for U.S. board of directors,82 the German Supervisory
Board is often blamed whenever managers, the Management Board, or
the company perform poorly or when internal controls fail.83
voting rights This control is further leveraged through the use of a pyramid structure. Half of
the shares of Porsche Automobil Holding are ordinary voting shares, and the other half are
non-voting shares. The Porsche and Piëch families own the ordinary shares, but not the non-
voting shares. Through these structural devices, the families control five board seats (half of
the investor representatives on the supervisory board), while limiting their own economic
exposures.”); Geoffrey Smith & Roger Parloff, Hoaxwagen: How the Massive Diesel Fraud
Incinerated VW’s Reputation—and Will Hobble the Company for Years to Come, FORTUNE
(Mar. 7, 2016), http://fortune.com/inside-volkswagen-emissions-scandal/ (“By law, Lower
Saxony has been granted veto power over VW’s strategic decisions.”)
78. Carsten Jungmann, The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and
Two-Tier Board Systems: Evidence from the UK and Germany, 3 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV.
426, 427.
79. See supra Part II (discussing two-tiered structure of German boards).
80. See Grit Tungler, The Anglo-American Board of Directors and the German Super-
visory Board – Marionettes in a Puppet Theatre of Corporate Governance or Efficient Con-
trolling, 12 BOND L. REV. 230, 233 (2000), http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=1194&context=blr.
81. Id. at 234.
82. See Nicola F. Sharpe, Questioning Authority: The Critical Link Between Board
Power and Process, 38 J. CORP. L. 1, 15 (2012)
83. Tungler, supra note 80, at 233 (U.S. boards of directors are often blamed when
corporations fail); James D. Westphal & Michael Bednar, Pluralistic Ignorance in Corporate
Boards and Firms’ Strategic Persistence in Response to Low Firm Performance, 50 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 262, 263 (2005) (“Yet there is considerable qualitative and anecdotal evidence that
boards often fail to check executives’ tendencies to persist with failing strategies, regardless
of the number of outside directors on the board.”); see also Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black,
The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J.
CORP. L. 231 (2002) (finding that firms with more independent boards do not perform better
than other firms); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between
Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921, 922 (1999) (presenting evi-
dence that overall firm performance was not correlated to the composition of the board and
that “[i]ndependent directors often turn out to be lapdogs rather than watchdogs”); Dan R.
Dalton et al., Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Finan-
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During the reorganization of German governance codes in the 1990s,
much focus went into reforming the role and the power of the Supervisory
Board.84  Principally, the members of the Supervisory Board appoint the
members of the Management Board;85  similarly, U.S. boards are respon-
sible for hiring and firing the senior executives of their respective corpora-
tions.86  The role of Supervisory Board members also requires them to call
shareholder meetings; to oversee the financial health of the company, in-
cluding examining annual financial statements; and to remove manage-
ment members.  Personal liability exists for failure to meet the equivalent
of a fiduciary duty.87
2. Board of Managers
The Management Board is said to be “responsible for managing the
company,” and “[i]ts members are jointly accountable for the management
of the company.”88
Volkswagen’s Management Board is comprised of nine members, each
of which is responsible for one or more upper-management functions
within the Volkswagen Group.  There are two types of members: (1) those
that are chairs for other Volkswagen affiliate brands such as Audi and (2)
those that hold a role similar to a department head in a U.S. corporation
and oversee organizational functions such as “Finance and Controlling” or
“procurement.”89  Matthias Muller, who was appointed CEO in Septem-
ber 2015, is the Chairman of Volkswagen’s Management Board.90
cial Performance, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 269, 278 (1998) (finding “little support for a sys-
tematic relationship” between board composition and financial performance); Sydney
Finkelstein & Ann C. Mooney, Not the Usual Suspects: How to Use Board Process to Make
Boards Better, 17 ACAD. MGMT. 101, 102 (2003) (studying the relationship of several indicia
of board independence to shareholder returns and finding that there was “no significant dif-
ference in the number of outsiders, director shareholdings, board size, and CEO duality”
between the firms that performed in the upper quartile of the S&P 500 and those that per-
formed in the lower quartile). See generally John A. Wagner et al., Board Composition and
Organizational Performance: Two Studies of Insider/Outsider Effects, 35 J. MGMT. STUD. 655,
655 (1998) (Their results “suggest the existence of a curvilinear homogeneity effect in which
performance is enhanced by the greater relative presence of either inside or outside
directors”).
84. JEAN J. DU PLESSIS ET AL., GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL CONTEXT 20 (2d ed., 2012).
85. Jungmann, supra note 78, at 427-32.
86. While Volkswagen was permitted some special exceptions due to the Volkswagen
Law (see supra discussion Part II.A.4), it still followed the dual board structure mandated by
the German Stock Corporation Act (see supra Part II.A.1) and composition required under
the Codetermination Act (see supra Part II.A.2), thus Volkswagen is still representative of
the structural design mandated under German Law.
87. PLESSIS ET AL., supra note 84, at 20; see also Tungler, supra note 80, at 232.
88. DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX, supra note 51.
89. Executive Bodies, VOLKSWAGEN, http://www.volkswagenag.com/en/group/execu
tive-bodies.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
90. Id.
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The Management Board does not have internal committees.  Rather,
separate sub-Management Boards from other brands (e.g., Audi) and re-
gions (e.g., North America) report to the various brand chairs and “de-
partment heads” that sit on the Management Board.  A sub-Management
Board of particular relevance is the “Board of Management of the Volk-
swagen Passenger Cars” brand, which is headed by Dr. Herbert Diess as of
July 1, 2015.91
The Management Board has substantial discretion over both decision
making and the information that the Supervisory Board utilizes in approv-
ing major business decisions.  Particularly, the Management Board is en-
trusted with managing the business under section 76(1) of the German
Stock Corporation Act (“AktG”) that requires it to install an adequate
risk management and control system within Volkswagen.  While major de-
cisions necessitate the approval of the Supervisory Board, the Manage-
ment Board comprises the true operators of the company.
C. Volkswagen Board Regulations and Deviations Complying with
German Corporate Code
The remainder of this section will provide a more in-depth examina-
tion of Volkswagen’s corporate governance structure, with an underlying
focus on the composition and on the decision-making process of Volk-
swagen board.  While Volkswagen is organized as an AG, its parent com-
pany, whose owners exert control and influence over the Volkswagen
board, organizes as an SE subject to the rules of all other SEs.92  Volk-
swagen, its holding companies, and its parent all maintain a Management
Board and a Supervisory Board.
Unions and employees also hold votes on the Supervisory Board and
the Board of Managers.  These agreements function as a larger under-
standing between labor and the management.  The agreement notwith-
standing, Volkswagen must comply with the Codetermination Act that
requires half of board members to represent employment.93  Volkswagen
itself maintains a grandfathered, unique board structure that does not
comply with many of the regulations, but the government excuses it from
91. Brand Management, VOLKSWAGEN, http://en.volkswagen.com/en/company/brand-
management/brand-management.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2017).
92. See Volkswagen and Porsche Create Integrated Automotive Group, VOLKSWAGEN
(July 4, 2012), http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2012/07/
Automotive_ Group.html [https://perma.cc/YU7W-ALNZ].
93. Carl et al., supra note 70, at 4 (“Employees of foreign subsidiaries are not counted.
For determining the relevant number under the One-third Participation Act, the employees
of subsidiaries of a company are only included if a domination agreement is in place between
the parent and the relevant subsidiary, or the controlled company is integrated into the par-
ent company. A domination agreement is an agreement entitling the dominating enterprise
to issue instructions to the dominated enterprise. For purposes of the Co-determination Act,
the employees of all enterprises belonging to a group of companies must be included.”).
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complete compliance based on its partial state ownership.94  As a result,
Volkswagen’s structure deviates from the norm, failing both tests of
codetermination and independence.95  As discussed above, Volkswagen
receives special protection from the “Volkswagen Act,” in part due to its
importance to the German economy.96
Unions and government representatives, such as those from the state
of Lower Saxony, generally cooperate with management through inter-
twined employment and control agreements.97  A former executive be-
lieves the close cooperation between owners and unions stems from
Volkswagen’s national mission of full employment.98  In a 2004 effort to
repeal the Volkswagen Act, the lawyers for Germany argued “that be-
cause of its size, Volkswagen is a strategic national asset that needs to be
protected.”99  The Act has resulted in lower profitability from Volk-
swagen, has deviated from the standard mission to maximize profits, 100
and has caused the firm to employ much higher numbers of employees
than in other comparably sized car companies. 101  Many of these employ-
ees work in the state of Lower Saxony, reinforcing the culture of prioritiz-
ing the company’s and employee’s survival and contributing to the
eventual culture of complicity to the outside world.102  The interconnected
nature of these relationships and the general interdependence of the board
representatives left the board without the requisite independence to moni-
tor the company.
It is widely accepted that the board typically exercises its authority
through oversight or monitoring of managers.  The next Part of this Arti-
cle examines why the Volkswagen Supervisory Board not only lacked in-
dependence, but was also subject to significant psychological and practical
limitations, stemming from both the board’s composition and dependency
94. See generally Sevis, supra note 76 (discussing the “Volkswagen law” restricting
shareholders’ full exercise of voting rights in Volkswagen AG).
95. Id.
96. Paul Meller, Europe Set to Challenge German Law Guarding VW, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 13, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/13/business/worldbusiness/europe-set-to-
challenge-german-law-guarding-vw.html. For information on the size of Volkswagen, see also
John McElroy, How Volkswagen is Run Like No Other Car Company, AUTOBLOG (Dec. 6,
2012), http://www.autoblog.com/2012/12/06/how-volkswagen-is-run-like-no-other-car-com
pany/ [https://perma.cc/V365-XKWK]. For a discussion of Volkswagen’s importance to Ger-
many’s economy see supra Part II.A.4.
97. See Milne, supra note 20.
98. James Stewart, Problems at Volkswagen Start in the Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/business/international/problems-at-volks
wagen-start-in-the-boardroom.html?_r=0.
99. Meller, supra note 96.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. REUTERS, Volkswagen Just Got More Bad News About the Emissions Scandal,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-vw-faces-more-bad-news-
from-emissions-scandal-lower-saxony-pm-2016-3.
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on the Management Board’s information.  Viewed through an organiza-
tional behavior lens, the Supervisory Board’s time, information, and
knowledge were severely constrained.103  In summary, the Supervisory
Board was and is subject to significant process limitations that ultimately
contributed to its oversight failure of the Volkswagen emissions scandal.
III. COSMETIC INDEPENDENCE, POOR PROCESS,
AND STRUCTURAL FAILURE
While a two-tier board has unique checks and balances lacking in
American boards, Volkswagen’s deviation from these checks and balances
as well as its poor culture of compliance led to its downfall.  In American
corporations, like German corporations, the board’s control or monitoring
role, is by far the most prevalent role in legal scholarship.104  Viewed from
this lens, Volkswagen’s board failed to monitor its managers.  In fact, the
board was so uninformed and uninvolved in decision making that one for-
mer senior Volkswagen executive said, “The board was really just for
show.”105  The following section explores and categorizes how the Super-
visory Board had little more than a name and how it had no substantive
supervisory role.
A. Volkswagen: Cosmetic Independence and Structural Failures
Volkswagen’s board structure reveals the weaknesses of several ele-
ments of the German board structure.  Principally, Volkswagen’s board
103. See generally Nicola Faith Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate
Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435 (2011).
104. See Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to
Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1351 (2007). For an in-depth analysis of the monitoring
model of the board, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1253, 1278 (1999) (“The managerial model of the board has now been supplanted by
a monitoring model.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 11 (2002) (“One of the
favorite projects of corporate reformers has been the creation of the so-called ‘monitoring’
board.”); Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why In-
vestors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 673–77
(2003). In addition to the control or monitoring role, the other roles include the boards rela-
tional role, which is grounded in resource dependence theory and the stewardship role, found
in stewardship theory. See generally Mark Macus, Board Capability: An Interactions Perspec-
tive on Boards of Directors and Firm Performance, 38 INT’L STUD. MGMT. & ORG. 98, 100
(2008) (discussing stewardship theory and the role of the board of directors. In their rela-
tional role, boards use their network of connections and individual resources, such as their
expertise, to serve the firm. This is often done through providing access to outside resources,
such as sources of credit or supply networks and through providing useful advice. For a more
in depth discussion of resources-dependence, see generally JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R.
SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PER-
SPECTIVE (1978). In its stewardship role, the board severs as a steward to management and
seeks to empower managers to be better leaders of the company. See generally Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decision Making in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 10 (2002).
105. Milne, supra note 20.
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lacked practical independence.  The DCGK requires boards, and espe-
cially audit committees, to meet rigorous standards of independence under
5.3.2 of the DCGK.  A firm wishing to deviate must declare so in its an-
nual declaration of conformity.106  Volkswagen, in its 2014 declaration, de-
cried what it viewed as the DCGK author’s ambiguous view of
independence.  The Management Board explained that it would declare a
deviation from the DCGK as a result of the indirect interest many Man-
agement Board members held with Porsche as a “precautionary mea-
sure.”107  A year later, in another “precautionary measure,” Volkswagen
once again declared that the Chair of the Audit Committee may be lacking
independence because “of his membership of the Supervisory Board of
Porsche Automobile Holding SE, kinship with other members of the Su-
pervisory Board of [Volkswagen] and [other connections to the Porsche
and Piech families].”108  Volkswagen, however, thought that “in the opin-
ion of the Supervisory Board and the Board of Management, these rela-
tionships do not constitute a conflict of interest nor do they interfere with
his duties as the Chairman of the Audit Committee.”109
Specifically, the test for independence according to the German Cor-
porate Governance Code states that:
The Supervisory Board shall include what it considers to be an appropriate
number of independent members, thereby taking into account the shareholder
structure.  Within the meaning of this recommendation, Supervisory Board
members are to be considered non-independent in particular if they have a
personal or business relationship with the corporation, its governing bodies, a
controlling shareholder or a company affiliated with the controlling share-
holder that may cause a substantial and not merely temporary conflict of in-
terest.  No more than two former members of the Management Board shall be
members of the Supervisory Board.  Members of the Supervisory Board shall
not be members of governing bodies of, or exercise advisory functions at, sig-
nificant competitors of the company.110
Volkswagen’s Supervisory Board lacked independence because it devi-
ated greatly from the standard board structure.  This deviation stemmed
from its hybrid control—a partially state run, partially private entity—and
106. DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX, supra note 51, at 2.
107. Declaration of the Board Management and the Supervisory Board of Volkswagen
AG on the Recommendations of the Government Commission of the German Corporate Gov-
ernance Code Pursuant to Section 161 of the German Stock Corporation Act, VOLKSWAGEN
(Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/content/en/investor_relations/
corporate_governance/declaration_of_conformity.bin.html/downloadfilelist/downloadfile/
downloadfile_12/file/GC_ Eblanko+21.11.14.pdf.
108. Declaration of the Board Management and the Supervisory Board of Volkswagen




110. DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX [DCGK] [GERMAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CODE], § 5.4.2, translation at http://www.dcgk.de/en/code/current-version/su
pervisory-board.html (Ger.).
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the Porsche family’s practical control of the boardroom.  For instance, the
Supervisory Board included Dr. Wolfgang Porsche, the Chairman of vari-
ous Porsche entities, including: Porsche AG and Porsche Automobil Hold-
ing SE as well as the CFO and Deputy President of Porsche Automobil
Holding SE and Porsche AG, Holger P. Harter.111
Volkswagen allocated over half of the Supervisory Board’s manage-
ment positions to Porsche and Piech members as part of a dramatic take-
over that occurred several years ago, and these members generally vote as
a single bloc on all issues.112  One of the most striking indicators of family
influence occurred in 2012 when shareholders elected Piech’s former gov-
erness, then fourth wife, and previous kindergarten teacher to the Supervi-
sory Board. 113  Although many shareholders protested her qualifications
and independence, they simply lacked the influence to effect change.  In
the year prior to the scandal breaking, the two families controlled four
board seats, with the state of Saxony and Qatar holdings each seating two
representatives.114  Additionally, in the same year, the Chairman at the
time, Hans Dieter Potsch, was Volkswagen’s former finance director and
was close to both of the owning families.115  Such an allocation raises is-
sues of the families putting forward unqualified or under qualified candi-
dates.  Furthermore, codetermination requires that half the Supervisory
Board seats go to workers.  The ten employee representatives are all Ger-
man workers who have traditionally aligned with management’s position
and who appreciate the importance of Volkswagen to the German econ-
omy.116  At Volkswagen, a former trade union (employee) board repre-
sentative, Berthold Huber, who was the former head of the IG Metall
labor union, served as interim chair of Volkswagen after Ferdinand Piech
resigned in April 2015.117
The Supervisory Board also functioned as a ‘captured board’ of long
time manager and family patriarch Mr. Piech.118  Through family connec-
tions and charismatic leadership, he indirectly or directly made every im-
portant decision in the company.
111. VOLKSWAGEN, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 111-12 (2009).
112. See Gwyn Topham, Volkswagen Swallows Porsche, The Guardian (Jul. 5, 2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jul/05/volkswagen-buys-porsche; Stewart, supra
note 98 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/business/international/problems-at-volkswagen-
start-in-the-boardroom.html.(“Porsche and Piech family members own over half of the vot-
ing shares and vote them as a bloc under a family agreement.”)
113. Stewart, supra note 98.
114. Milne, supra note 20.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. VW Interim Chairman to Stay On, Hunt for Piech Successor Continues: Bild,
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B. Volkswagen’s Decision Making Capacity
Volkswagen’s decision making capacity begins with the structural com-
position of the two boards, but the processes and avenues of power within
the organization paint a different picture of family control and employee
interests.  As noted, Volkswagen does not comply with the necessary levels
of independence the Corporate Governance Code contemplates.119  The
2015 annual report showed that at Volkswagen, a large number of pre-
ferred votes actually voted on the board.120  In 2015, the voting rights of
the company, as represented through the Supervisory Board, includes the
following: 52.2% from Porsche SE (its parent company in the control of
the Porsche family), 20% from the state of lower Saxony, Hanover, 17%
from Qatar holdings, and 10.8% from others, represented from a single
seat on the Supervisory Board.121
The below photo from Volkswagen captures the structure of the
organization:122
FIGURE 1
Notably, Volkswagen has shaken up its Management Board and spun
off much of the decision making power to various regional brands follow-
ing the scandal.  This change implies that the Supervisory Board held too
much centralized decision-making power.123  Critics have pointed to the
119. See supra Part II.C.
120. VOLKSWAGEN AG, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2016).
121. Shareholder Structure, VOLKSWAGEN (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.volkswagen
.com/en/InvestorRelations/shares/shareholder-structure.html.
122. Volkswagen and Porsche Create Integrated Automotive Group, VOLKSWAGEN
(July 5, 2012), http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2012/07/
Automotive_Group.html [https://perma.cc/YU7W-ALNZ].
123. See The Volkswagen Group is Restructuring: Supervisory Board Passes Resolutions
for New Organization, VOLKSWAGEN (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.volkswagen-media-ser
vices.com/en/detailpage/-/detail/The-Volkswagen-Group-is-restructuring-Supervisory-Board-
passes-resolutions-for-new-organization/view/2726863/7a5bbec13158edd433c6630f5ac445da?
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failure of the independence of the Supervisory Board.124  Additionally,
early analysis points to a failure of independence and authority at the Su-
pervisory Board level, largely due to strong representation of employees,
family control, and state protection.125  Taken together, the Supervisory
Board promoted a dysfunction and a complicity that allowed the scandal
to proceed, and it adopted a centralized policy from the works council that
failed to prevent the scandal.126  The choice to make policy first from the
work council and then bring it before the board, nonetheless, does not
fully explain the scandal.  After all, the American model of allowing share-
holders little policy involvement continues to function with varying suc-
cess; however, certainly, it does not necessitate failure.
Decision making at Volkswagen was largely centralized within each
brand, creating separate “silos” for different brands.127  The structure re-
lied heavily on senior leadership for direction, with a culture that left
many junior managers afraid to speak up.128  Decision making capacity at
Volkswagen hampered communication and did not allow for middle man-
agers to honestly communicate with their superiors.  The demanding top
down centralization of the company left little room for outside inputs and
concerns.129  Recent efforts to reorganize included: grouping brands by
region, grouping brands by market, and creating blocs of three brands into
single management cores.130  Management intended to give each of those
groups more autonomy.  Despite attempts to change this structure, each
Volkswagen brand retains high levels of autonomy within the decision
making process of maximizing its own position,131 with ultimate decision
making continuing to run through senior management.
p_p_auth=X6W5O8dM [https://perma.cc/7NCG-74KE] [hereinafter Volkswagen Group
Restructuring].
124. See Milne, supra note 20.
125. See id.
126. See id. For an explanation and definition of a German works council, see L.
Fulton, Workplace Representation in Europe, ETUI (2015), http://www.worker-participation.
eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Germany/Workplace-Representation/ (explain-
ing that works councils provide representation for employees at the workplace and have
substantial powers including “an effective right of veto on some issues;” works council elec-
tions are held every four years).
127. VW Group to be revamped into 4 holding companies, reports say, AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS, (June 15, 2015, 3:46 AM), http://www.autonews.com/article/20150615/COPY01/
306159919/vw-group-to-be-revamped-into-4-holding-companies-reports-say.
128. Ferrazi, supra note 22. See also Chris Bryant & Richard Milne, Volkswagen’s
‘Uniquely Awful’ Governance At Fault In Emissions Scandal, CNBC.COM (Oct. 4, 2015, 8:12
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/04/volkswagens-uniquely-awful-governance-at-fault-in-
emissions-scandal.html.
129. See generally Jack Ewing, VW Says Emissions Cheating Was Not a One-Time Er-
ror, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/business/international/
vw-emissions-scandal.html (noting that members of the Volkswagen Supervisory Board “con-
ceded that the deception reflected organizational shortcomings”).
130. Volkswagen Group Restructuring, supra note 123.
131. AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, supra note 127.
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Following the break of the scandal, Mr. Piech resigned, as did the di-
rector of Volkswagen America.  Besides decentralizing management from
the executive suite in Lower Saxony, the company made little other sub-
stantive changes.  The board insisted that it had a lack of knowledge about
the engineering scandal;132 neither the shareholders nor company re-
placed any members of either the Supervisory Board or Management
Board.  Although the company currently turned over several key posi-
tions, it retained a family connection and control.133  The Supervisory
Board did not change the control structure of the company or ratio of
representation on the Supervisory Board; currently, the board only main-
tains one independent voice, Annika Falkengren.134  The Management
Board, moreover, continues to use some codetermination; this may con-
tinue to incentivize structures that protect employees and encourages full
employment, including employees at fault.  The culture of Lower Saxony
Hanover and the insulated region in which Volkswagen operates provides
insular political thinking, and many blame American regulators for the
onerous standards that ‘caused’ the scandal.135
C. Process Failure
The atypical ownership and indirect interest structure of Volkswagen
lays bare the incredible challenge to creating a dynamic board capable of
avoiding and mitigating scandals.  But failures of board structure best prin-
ciples do not prevent the implementation of process changes, nor should
the shortcomings of one board structure or of process changes impinge on
the implementation of the other.  Supervisory and Management Board
members still lack key process tools to prevent future wrongdoing.  The
Volkswagen board also provides a case study of improving the indepen-
dence and oversight of a board that will never retain actual independence
and provides an opportunity to test theories of independence as a cure-all
following scandals.  As I have noted in earlier work, three key elements
any decision-making group must have in order to make effective judg-
ments are time, information, and knowledge.136  Volkswagen’s board was
lacking in each of these three categories.
1. Time
Boards often lack the time necessary to accomplish crucial tasks of
guiding a company.137  When a board fails to devote sufficient time to
issues confronting the company, the board’s decision making speed slows,
132. See generally id. at 2.
133. See Milne, supra note 20, at 3-7.
134. Id. at 3 (noting that Falkengren is chief executive of Swedish bank SEB and ques-
tioning her independence due to SEB’s role as an advisor to one of VW’s twelve brands).
135. Id.
136. See generally Sharpe, supra note 103.
137. Id. at 1453.
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and this failure belies the board’s effectiveness in guiding the company.138
For example, American boards meet on average 8 times a year.139  The
Volkswagen Supervisory Board met with shocking infrequency.  The
board usually held between five and six meetings a year from 2008 (when
the company started using defeat devices) to 2015 (when the scandal









The limited number of Supervisory Board meetings raises concerns
that the Volkswagen Supervisory Board may not have devoted the time
necessary to properly monitor the corporation.
Volkswagen boards also consist of members that are not truly indepen-
dent due to the relationship with the company—this includes both family
members and employees of the company—and sometimes both.149  More-
over, the Volkswagen board must comply with the regulations of Ger-
many, the European Union, and each of the member states in which it
operates.150  It also contends with international regulations.151  The byzan-
138. Id. at 1454.
139. Id. at 1453.
140. No annual report or readily available information online, however, explained how
long the Board met.
141. VOLKSWAGEN, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 111, at 4.
142. VOLKSWAGEN, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2010), https://www.volkswagenag.com/
presence/investorrelation/publications/annual-reports/2010/volkswagen/Y_2009_e.pdf.
143. VOLKSWAGEN, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2011).
144. VOLKSWAGEN, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2012), https://www.volkswagenag.com/
presence/investorrelation/publications/annual-reports/2012/volkswagen/english/Y_2011_e
.pdf.
145. VOLKSWAGEN, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2013).
146. VOLKSWAGEN, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2014).
147. VOLKSWAGEN, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2015).
148. VOLKSWAGEN, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2016).
149. See DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX, supra note 110 (“Supervisory
Board members are to be considered non-independent in particular if they have a personal
or business relationship with the corporation, its governing bodies, a controlling shareholder
or a company affiliated with the controlling shareholder that may cause a substantial and not
merely temporary conflict of interest.”); see also Milne, supra note 20, at 3.
150. Ferrazi, supra note 22.
151. For a discussion of the EU’s oversight over Volkswagen’s structure, see supra Part
II.A.4 and Part II.C.
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tine top-down structure of the decision-making consumed the time of the
board, as regional brand decision-making shifted to the purview of the
board.
2. Information
Boards need access to recent and complete information in order to
make informed decisions.152  Unfortunately, the Volkswagen board mem-
bers lacked access to complete and useful information.  Coverage of the
scandal indicates the board created an environment of insulation around
the engineers designing the diesel products.  The board may have lacked
information about the ability of the engineers to create a diesel engine
within the diesel standards.  Although executives received information
about the ability to cheat the EPA testing system, the investigation into
Volkswagen found no similar presentation to the board.  The board lacked
the information about the goals and the limitations of the program.153
Volkswagen’s process did not yield information dissemination that
would lead a board to substantively understand the company’s challenges
and strategies.  For example, in most German companies, the chairman
would approach the shareholder side of the Supervisory Board first, find a
common position, and then bring the matter before the entire board.154
This process was not the case at Volkswagen.  The former chairman, Ferdi-
nand Piech, who was in charge from 2002 until he stepped down in 2015,
would first talk to the works council (employee side) and then come to
shareholder representatives.155  That meant that the boardroom was not
privy to many sensitive matters that were resolved without their over-
sight.156  In addition, board members could not seek out additional infor-
mation to supplement their knowledge and to aid them in their oversight
role.157
Supervisory board members have stated that they did not know any-
thing about cheating on emissions testing and that they never discussed
the defeat device.158  In fact, three members said they did not know any-
thing until two weeks after executives had admitted to the scandal.159  The
consensus among academics, governance professionals, and lawyers is that
152. Sharpe, supra note 103, at 1453.
153. Ferrazi, supra note 22.
154. Milne, supra note 20.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (The same former senior VW executive said that the board “lacked the ability
to ask any deep technical questions – and you see that in the current scandal”).
158. Id.
159. Jack Ewing & Jad Mouawad, Directors Say Volkswagen Delayed Informing Them
of Trickery, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/24/business/inter
national/directors-say-volkswagen-delayed-informing-them-of-trickery.html.
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Volkswagen’s information deficit was severe and was indicative of a much
larger communication problem.160
Even if the board had the available information about the current sta-
tus of the cheating devices and information about the development of the
related vehicles, the investigation into the scandal made clear that the
board may have lacked the imperative to act upon it.  The board func-
tioned much like a family business, with most of the control concentrated
within the Porsche family and employees, with the local state government
standing by to prevent drastic change using the Volkswagen Law.  A for-
mer Volkswagen executive told the New York Times, “There’s no other
company where the owners and the unions are working so closely together
as Volkswagen.”161  He added that the company “guarantees jobs for over
half the Supervisory Board.” 162  The interest of management, union em-
ployees, and the government were all aligned.163
In conclusion, the board lacked independent access to information and
lacked access to a sufficient number of outsiders with information about
the implications about such a decision.
3. Knowledge
A board requires in-depth knowledge about the firm and its opera-
tion.164  In fact, the German Corporate Governance Code requires that
“[t]he composition of the Supervisory Board has to ensure that its mem-
bers collectively have the knowledge, skills, and professional expertise re-
quired to properly perform all duties”165  Independence requirements, on
most boards, require members to acquaint themselves with the inner
workings of a company with which they rarely interact.166  Volkswagen,
however, operates with the opposite problem.  Nearly every member on
the board functioned as an insider, whether through connections to the
Porsche family or the Volkswagen organization.167  Unlike most board
failures, the board knew exactly how the firm made money.  Despite
knowledge about the automobile industry generally, the board lacked
firm-specific knowledge about the technical details required to manufac-
160. Id. (Markus Kienle, a Frankfurt lawyer and board member of SdK, a shareholder-
advocacy group, said of the Supervisory Board, “That they were not informed about a prob-
lem of this dimension, that points to a huge communications problem.”); see also Stewart,
supra note 98 (Professor Elson called the organization an “echo chamber”).
161. Stewart, supra note 98.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Sharpe, supra note 103.
165. See supra Part III.A.; see also DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX
[GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE]  §  5.4.1, translation at http://www.dcgk.de/en/
code/current-version/supervisory-board (Ger.).
166. Id.
167. See Bryant & Milne, supra note 128 (“VW’s Supervisory Board is short of people
with relevant experience and skills and — significantly — independence.”).
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ture vehicles compliant with relevant regulatory requirements.168  Argua-
bly, the board did not have enough members with the experience and with
the skills needed to effectively oversee management.169  Information that
has trickled out during the investigation indicates that the Supervisory
Board did not have the kind of technical knowledge necessary to detect
defeat devices.  A former senior Volkswagen executive noted that the Su-
pervisory Board “lacked the ability to ask deep technical questions – you
see that in the current scandal.”170  Additionally, a former Supervisory
Board member said, “Matters of technical expertise were not for us.”171
There are many explanations for the board’s lack of technical knowl-
edge.  One longtime executive stated that such a scandal “was all but inev-
itable” due to “the company’s isolation, its clannish board and a deep-
rooted hostility to environmental regulations among its engineers.”  That
executive went on to say that the owners and union will “look the other
way about anything” other than its “national mission to provide employ-
ment to the German people.”172  One former director said that life under
former CEO Winterkorn was a “dictatorship” where “no dissent” was al-
lowed.173  The investigation revealed a culture of subversion to the CEO’s
goals, a strict hierarchy, and a lack of independent will among board mem-
bers.  Taken together, the inaction of the board to change the toxic struc-
ture of Volkswagen, a structure that bred insular thinking, presents a
thorny challenge for any future leaders of the organization.
IV. POLLUTED INFORMATION AND POOR PROCESS
Dominant theories of German corporate governance and actual legis-
lative efforts within the European Union have mirrored efforts in the
United States to vest boards with significant responsibility for protecting
the corporation from malfeasance, fraud, and poor decisions.174  These ef-
forts are a far cry from what is necessary to establish effective safeguards.
Simply put, any group structure that removes a critical decision making or
monitoring body from the primary information gatherers and from the in-
dividuals implementing corporate decisions is an exercise in futility.  The
German academic and legislative efforts do not properly calibrate and ap-
preciate the gap between the nominal authority given to a board and this
board’s practical ability to monitor or effect a corporation’s trajectory.
This Part draws on my prior work to identify the components necessary
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. Milne, supra note 20.
171. Id.
172. Stewart, supra note 98.
173. Milne, supra note 20.
174. See DELOITTE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM: INFORMATION FOR SUPERVI-
SORY BOARD AND AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS 17 (Mar. 2012), http://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/de/Documents/governance-risk-compliance/GRC-Newsletter-CGF-3-
2012-engl.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BLB-K72Q].
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for a decision-making body, such as Volkswagen’s Supervisory Board, to
have meaningful influence over the decisions of management.  It con-
cludes by identifying the ways in which these components were lacking in
Volkswagen’s Supervisory Board.
A. Corporate Failure and Failed Process
Studies of corporate control within American corporations have found
that in practice boards do not effectively constrain or influence managerial
decision-making.175  Despite the two-tier structure, Volkswagen’s board
arguably failed in this manner as well.  Thus, it is important to once again
examine how a Supervisory Board can and should exert influence over
managerial decisions.
An organizational behavior approach to group decision making pro-
vides the answers.176  The decision-making process a group utilizes is de-
terminative of its practical efficacy.  Within the organizational behavior
literature, there are multiple descriptions of what constitutes an effective
decision-making process.177  These components are the basis of my Pro-
cess Oriented Approach.  They are best separated into five distinct steps,
including: “identifying the problem for which a decision must be made,
analyzing the problem and possible response, deciding on a response, ap-
proving that response, and implementing the final decision.”178
Part IV.B will examine each step in turn and then analyze how Volk-
swagen’s Supervisory Board disadvantaged the directors.  Concrete exam-
ples of Volkswagen’s decision-making process over the course of the
almost decade long emissions testing deception and scandal illustrate the
need for gatekeepers, such as the Supervisory Board, to have the informa-
tion and authority necessary to detect and deter malfeasance.
B. Five Steps for an Effective Decision-Making Process
This Part evaluates how each of the five steps of an effective decision-
making process—identification, analysis, choice of response, approval, and
implementation—are critical to successful monitoring and decision-mak-
175. See Neil Fligstein & Peter Brantley, Bank Control, Owner Control, or Organiza-
tional Dynamics: Who Controls the Large Modern Corporation? 98 AM. J. SOC. 280, 280–307
(1992) (finding that boards have little influence on managers’ behavior).
176. LINDA K. STROH ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A MANAGEMENT CHAL-
LENGE 35-45 (3d ed. 2002); Chip Heath & Sim B. Sitkin, Big-B Versus Big-O: What is Organi-
zational About Organizational Behavior?, 22 J. ORG. BEHAV. 43, 51 (2001); Benjamin
Schneider, Organizational Behavior, 36 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 573, 574 (1985).
177. DECISION MAKING: AN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR APPROACH (Johannes M.
Pennnings ed., 2d ed. 1986).
178. Sharpe, supra note 82, at 22. For an example of a systematic decision-making pro-
cess, see JOHN R. SCHERMERHORN JR. ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, 196-97 (Wiley,
12th ed. 2012) (explaining that systematic decision-making involves: (1) recognizing and de-
fining problem/opportunity, (2) identifying and analyzing other courses of action, (3) choos-
ing best/preferred course of action, (4) implementing preferred option, and (5) evaluating the
results and following up).
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ing.  It includes a step-by-step examination of Volkswagen’s process, which
reveals how a Supervisory Board without proper information is in fact an
impotent gatekeeper incapable of preventing a scandal of the magnitude
of faking emission test results.
Broadly speaking, Volkswagen employs a “three lines of defense” risk
management system; however, each channel is funneled through the Man-
agement Board before the information makes it way to the Supervisory
Board.179  The three channels are: (1) companies and business unit level
operational risk management; (2) group governance risk and compliance;
and (3) group internal audit.180  The Management Board holds the exclu-
sive rights over the choice to inform the Supervisory Board, hence all ele-
ments of the decision-making process are limited by management’s self-
interest bias and any other shortcomings.
FIGURE 2181
179. VOLKSWAGEN, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147, at 161.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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1. Identification
Identification is the first step, and it is an example of where an organi-
zational behavior lens can provide a deeper understanding of what is nec-
essary for effective decision-making to occur.  In part, this result occurs
because successful gatekeeping and identification are closely intertwined.
Identification is the step where a decision-making body, such as the Volk-
swagen Supervisory Board, notes the scope of problems and identifies op-
portunities the firm faces and must consider.  For a decision-making body
to be effective, it should proactively (instead of passively) search for rele-
vant information and look for problem areas.  In other words, the informa-
tion it seeks should be forward-looking.182  Forward-looking information
allows for ex-ante identification of high risk areas and allows for a strategy
that anticipates and addresses problems before they occur.
A decision, whether explicit or implicit, about the order in which infor-
mation is gathered, reviewed, and digested is inherent in any information
gathering process.  There is a sequence to this process, which in turn cre-
ates the universe of alternatives, problems, and choices available to the
decision maker.183  The manner in which Volkswagen’s Supervisory Board
obtained information defines the outer boundaries of the types of
problems and opportunities they were able to identify.184  At Volkswagen,
the Management Board and other company executives performed the es-
sential gatekeeping function of searching and identifying information.185
The Management Board filtered all material information before it was
presented to the Supervisory Board.186  This was an inherent weakness
and limitation on the Supervisory Board’s ability to identify problematic
behaviors and concerns of the company.187  For example, at Volkswagen,
as far back as 2011, engineers and technicians tried to bring the informa-
tion to the attention of their superiors.188  Numerous employees, primarily
from the Wolfsburg location, confessed that they knew of the emission
evasion activities.189
The information gatherer’s biases, including her expertise and goals,
further narrow the universe of information that is obtained and
processed.190  It is common knowledge that individuals are more likely to
identify information that bolsters their credibility and supports their goals.
182. Sharpe, supra note 82, at 35.
183. See RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE
FIRM 10 (2d ed. 1992).
184. Id.
185. VOLKSWAGEN, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Leah M. Goodman, Why Volkswagen Cheated, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 15, 2015), http://
www.newsweek.com/2015/12/25/why-volkswagen-cheated-404891.html.
189. See id.
190. Cyert & March, supra note 183, at 10.
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Information that would make a project or a goal less feasible is unlikely to
be identified.  As a result, at Volkswagen, the Management Board had
already limited the known universe of alternatives to those that reflected
their priorities, interests, and goals, before the Supervisory Board had the
opportunity to examine the wider range of information.191  While uninten-
tional biases are problematic, decision makers who intentionally exert sig-
nificant bias in their information gathering to protect and to support their
self-interest are even more damaging, particularly when that information
is not shared with others.192
The positive side of Volkswagen’s emissions focus, and its introduction
of diesel in the U.S. Market was no secret.  With its goals in mind, Volk-
swagen continually presented biased and limited information to the Super-
visory Board and investing public.  Their annual reports going back to
2008 consistently mention emissions, evidencing its importance to Volk-
swagen.193  In 2009, the annual report praised the roll out of “clean diesel
in America.”  It stated:
Introducing clean diesel technology and the 1.61 TDI common rail engine in
the market established us to reach significant milestones for diesel engines in
2009, which will ensure that we will remain the innovation leader in the field
of diesel engine development. . . . These engines have enjoyed considerable
success in the North American market in particular, which tends to have a low
take-up of diesel.194
In 2011, Volkswagen continued to champion its efforts and to brag
about its success in the American market.  The annual report stated:
The Volkswagen Group has also continued to write the success story of the
diesel engine in other areas.  Steadily rising market shares in the North Amer-
ican market, which has a critical attitude towards diesel engines, and recogni-
tion in Europe . . . are examples of this.  We have also successfully advanced
the diesel engine in the higher engine capacity classes.195
Throughout the years of the scandal, Volkswagen was praising its ef-
forts, emphasizing its focus on emissions, and continuing to build upon its
success in North America.  Despite this, the Supervisory Board was kept
in the dark about the defeat device, which was the reason behind Volk-
swagen’s success.
The Volkswagen Management Board’s conscious and unconscious bi-
ases had already attached to the information that reached the Supervisory
Board.  This attachment was problematic because, as in most organiza-
tions, Volkswagen’s executives had a better understanding than the Super-
191. See supra Part IV.B.
192. George Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 955, 974–75 (discussing the strong incentives of agents to make decisions that
serve their self-interests).
193. See VOLKSWAGEN, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 111.
194. VOLKSWAGEN, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 178.
195. VOLKSWAGEN, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 144, at 215.
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visory Board of the challenges facing the company.196  The executives
were also the individuals that were the most motivated to obscure or to
highlight a problem.  Volkswagen was reputed to be a place of “command-
and-control”197 and a company “where even relatively minor decisions re-
quire approval from the high-rise executive office building.”198  Unfolding
news stories and information about the key decision-makers within Volk-
swagen indicate that they may have suffered from a pervasive and perni-
cious self-interest bias.199  Moreover, it appears that the Supervisory
Board did not receive the information that would have allowed it to dis-
cover the “defeat devices” and cheating on emissions testing.200
2. Analysis
Although identifying information is the most critical step in determin-
ing the range of choices presented to a decision-making body, proper anal-
ysis of that information is necessary for the decision-makers to engage in
an effective decision-making process.  Like information identification,
analysis is an information-intensive activity.  Specifically, decision-makers
must decide what information goes into the analysis of a particular
action.201
The Volkswagen Supervisory Board was required to conduct analysis,
particularly when a decision posed significant risk.  This reporting obliga-
tion is not a duty it could ignore or rubber stamp.  German courts have
clearly stated that all members of the Supervisory Board—individually
and as a group—must carry out an “independent risk analysis.”202  Ac-
cording to German courts, this analysis is of even greater importance when
a transaction is complex, strategically important, or involves a great deal
of risk.203  Volkswagen’s 2014 Annual Report shows that the Supervisory
Board at Volkswagen, instead, played a passive role.204  In fact, the Super-
visory Board met a mere six times throughout 2014.205  At Volkswagen,
the Supervisory Board’s representatives appeared to have lacked the ex-
196. See supra Part III.C.3 (discussing the Supervisory Board’s lack of expertise and
knowledge).
197. Ewing, supra note 129 .
198. Id.
199. Goodman, supra note 188 (discussing Volkswagen’s bonus system that rewarded
consensus: “But Volkswagen saw the 2004 EPA decision as an irresistible challenge—and an
opportunity. The automaker rolled out its new-model diesels in the U.S. in 2008 and won the
first Green Car of the Year award ever granted to a diesel at the Los Angeles Auto Show.”).
200. See supra Part III.C.2.
201. Sharpe, supra note 82, at 24.
202. DELOITTE, supra note 174.
203. Id.
204. VOLKSWAGEN, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147, at 7.
205. Id.
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pertise required to effectively analyze the information it received from the
Management Board.206
Experts were also concerned that the company’s culture “hamper[ed]
internal communication and may [have] discourage[ed] midlevel managers
from delivering bad news.”207  There was no system in place to ensure that
information relating to something of the magnitude of the emissions scan-
dal came to the attention of upper level management.208  The Supervisory
Board did not engage in an in-depth analysis of the Management Board’s
proposals; it simply accepted the information the Management Board
identified.  For instance, in 2008 when the Management Board presented
strategy to gain a “sustained foothold in the US Market,” the Supervisory
Board simply concurred.209
There have been consistent allegations that a select number of manag-
ers were responsible for perpetrating the emissions cheating scandal at
Volkswagen.210  The Supervisory Board was a passive recipient of the
Management Board’s analysis, cover-up, and reporting on Volkswagen’s
emission numbers.211  This fact runs contrary to the more engaged and
informed role a Supervisory Board should take.  Experts on best practices
for German boards posit that the Supervisory Board should actively mini-
mize risk.212  To do this task properly, the board must “intensively and in
detail” analyze the Management Board’s risk assessment.213  Further-
more, it should verify its assessment.214  There is no doubt that the analy-
sis the Volkswagen Supervisory Board received was subject to the
Management Board’s biases, limitations, and motivations.215  The Volk-
swagen Supervisory Board, however, did not scrutinize this information or
verify its accuracy.216  Consequently, the Supervisory Board failed to carry
206. See MOODY’S INV’RS SERV., Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft: Sweeping Corporate
Governance Reforms Remain At The Discretion Of Controlling Shareholders, AUTOACTU
.COM 4 (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.autoactu.com/doc_new/354RapportMoodysgouvernance
VW.pdf. See also Complaint, supra note 33, at 18-19.
207. Ewing, supra note 129 .
208. See id.
209. VOLKSWAGEN, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 111, at 6.
210. See Ferrazi, supra note 22; see also Jack Ewing, Volkswagen Inquiry’s Focus to
Include Managers Who Turned a Blind Eye, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes
.com/2015/10/26/business/international/volkswagen-investigation-focus-to-include-managers-
who-turned-a-blind-eye.html. Cf. Elson et. al., supra note 22, at 3 (“[T]he violations were
only the result of ‘the grave errors of a very few’ employees.”).
211. See generally VOLKSWAGEN, REPORT OF THE SUPERVISORY BOARD (2015), http://
annualreport2015.volkswagenag.com/strategy/report-of-the-supervisory-board.html [https://
perma.cc/KY2P-T7H8].
212. See DELOITTE, supra note 174, at 8.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See supra Part III.B.
216. See VOLKSWAGEN, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147.
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out an independent decision making process and failed to engage in “inde-
pendent risk analysis.”
3. Choice of Response
The Supervisory Board did not make an informed or active choice on
how to respond to the emission standards set by U.S. regulatory authori-
ties.  Even when management operates in good faith, a natural by-product
of any communication is that the very act of communicating something
changes the information in some way.  Often the result is information that
is withheld or distorted.  Most managers have to choose what information
to share and in what way to share it.217
The Volkswagen Supervisory Board made their decisions and con-
ducted their oversight on substantially less information than was available
to  Volkswagen managers and the Management Board—the group the Su-
pervisory Board was charged with monitoring.218  Volkswagen’s newest
chairman of the Supervisory Board, Hans-Dieter Pötsch, claims “that the
decision by employees to cheat on emissions tests was made more than a
decade ago, after they realized they could not meet United States clean air
standards legally.”219  Moreover, both persistently concede the cheating
was confined to a “small number of people” and was facilitated by organi-
zational structures that allowed the culpable group to insulate itself from
oversight both from the Management and from the Supervisory Boards.
However, evidence is beginning to emerge indicating that the Manage-
ment Board may have had knowledge of wrongdoing since 2006.220  Volk-
swagen has delayed the release of the fact report by their law firm, Jones
Day, because it imposes unacceptable risks.221
4. Approval
Based on Volkswagen’s 2014 Annual Report, the “Topics Discussed by
the Supervisory Board” mostly included approvals of Management Board
proposals and reports.222  Volkswagen’s Supervisory Board was a passive
recipient of the information the Management Board deemed relevant.  No
217. Jay W. Lorsch & Andy Zelleke, The Chairman’s Job Description, 30 DIRECTORS &
BOARDS 28, 29 (Fourth Quarter 2005) (explaining that receiving large amounts of informa-
tion without enough time to analyze and understand it is as much of a problem as receiving
inadequate or insufficient information).
218. See generally Ewing, supra note 129.
219. Id.
220. Georgina Prodhan et. al., Volkswagen Probe Finds Manipulation Was Open Secret
in Department, REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-emis
sions-investigation-idUSKCN0V02E7 [https://perma.cc/72JE-AX7A].
221. Jay Ramey, VW Seems Mighty Uncomfortable With Its Own Diesel Investigation
Report, AUTOWEEK (Apr. 25, 2016), http://autoweek.com/article/vw-diesel-scandal/vw-wont-
publish-internal-diesel-investigation-report-just-yet [https://perma.cc/A5K6-5KGB].
222. VOLKSWAGEN, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147, at 8-9.
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dissent was noted in the roughly 300 page Annual Report.223  The same is
true for annual reports in the preceding years.  In this manner, the infor-
mation contained in the reports is limited by the underlying biases of the
managers who obtained it; therefore, it will likely favor the goals and posi-
tions of the managers who prepared and presented it.  Even if there was a
“constructive conflict generation” mechanism in play, the Supervisory
Board’s composition likely produces significant psychological limits on dis-
sent (e.g., the Porsche and Piech family members who own a majority of
Volkswagen voting shares and who have four seats on the Supervisory
Board, and the labor representation that is partnered with management).
Thus, the Supervisory Board was poised to act as a “pawn” of the Manage-
ment Board by merely putting a rubber stamp on whatever came across
the table.  Supervisory Board approval was based on a deeply flawed deci-
sion-making process where managers and the Management Board had the
clear and overwhelming informational advantage.
5. Implementation
In German corporations, implementation, or the literal operationaliza-
tion of approved course of action, is subject to Supervisory Board over-
sight.224  The Volkswagen Supervisory Board relied heavily on reports,
including compliance and risk management assessments, prepared by the
Volkswagen Management Board.225  Like the previous four steps, success-
ful implementation depends on information about the organization.
Once a decision has been made, implementation is almost completely
within the purview of management.226  According to the German Corpo-
rate Governance Code, “The Management Board develops the strategy
for the company, agrees it with the Supervisory Board and ensures its im-
plementation.”227  Managers are responsible for general operations and
daily management activities.  As a result, managers have tremendous dis-
cretion as to how to operationalize the decisions that the board has ap-
proved.  Because boards almost always approve management’s
proposals,228 the problem is not whether management will zealously im-
223. Id. at 161.
224. See DELOITTE, supra note 174, at 8. (“The Supervisory Board supervises the Exec-
utive Board and therefore also the strategy, its implementation as well as the company’s
[Strategic Risk Management].”).
225. See VOLKSWAGEN, 2014 Annual Report, supra note 147.
226. See generally Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010); Id. §§ 109(a) (noting some
decisions, however, require board approval, including decisions involving mergers and acqui-
sitions, dissolution, and amending bylaws); Robert A. Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of
a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 696 (1960) (providing a
general discussion of the powers of the board under Delaware and other model laws).
227. DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX [GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE CODE] § 4.1.2, translation at http://www.dcgk.de/en/code/current-version/management-
board.html (Ger.).
228. See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal
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plement the decision, but whether the manner of implementation is consis-
tent with the understanding of the board and with the long-term health of
the corporation.  In the case of Volkswagen, the Supervisory Board’s im-
plementation assessments are almost exclusively confined to backward-
looking reports prepared by the very individuals who are being assessed.
As such, any deviations from expected initiatives would have to be self-
reported by the Management Board.
6. Information, Process, and Practical Authority
In a German corporation, the Supervisory Board’s decisions, like those
of all decision-making groups, are dependent on the information it re-
ceives.229  At Volkswagen, the Supervisory Board relied heavily on the
good faith of the Management Board, which extended to a pro forma re-
view of their decisions and recommendations.230  As a result, the Supervi-
sory Board lacked the relevant information it needed to make informed
decisions.  Consequently, it did not fulfill two of its mandates under Ger-
man Law.  First, under section 111(1) of the German Stock Corporation
Act (“AktG”), it was required to “monitor the Executive [Management]
Board.”231  Second, a Supervisory Board has a duty to supervise the sys-
tems within the company that are intended to identify risk, specifically the
control and monitoring systems.232  The Volkswagen Supervisory Board
failed in both instances.  Figure 3 below, illustrates step-by-step the Pro-
cess Oriented Approach.  For a German Supervisory Board to effectively
do their job, they must implement an approach such as the one suggested
below. 233
Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 293-95 (2004) (discussing status quo bias and the other cognitive
biases that lead boards to defer to management and the CEO).
229. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATIONS 48-49 (1974). (“Decisions
are necessarily a function of information.”).
230. See generally Prodhan, supra note 220. But see Jay Ramey, VW Board Clears Itself
of Wrongdoing in Diesel Scandal, AUTOWEEK (May 13, 2016), http://autoweek.com/article/
vw-diesel-scandal/vw-board-clears-itself-wrongdoing-diesel-scandal.
231. AKTIENGESETZ [AKTG] [STOCK CORPORATION ACT], supra note 67, at § 111(1).
232. Id. at § 107(3).
233. See generally Sharpe, supra note 82, at 27.





























Board is the sole 
source of 
information for the 
Supervisory 
Board.  In order to 
avoid the 
limitations and 








Board. In addition, 
the Supervisory 
Board should 









does not allow 















provides.  By 
doing so, the 
Supervisory 
Board is better 




In order to decide 






the risk level of 
each alternative. 
There should be 
an element of 
intentional 
constructive 
dissent at the 
Management 
Board level or 
through other 












no evidence of 
dissent.  Given 
the limitations 




should enlist an 
independent 
third party 
(e.g., audit or 
consulting 










Once a decision 
is made, the 
Management 
Board must 




















directly on the 
implementation.
Each of the steps above are critical to the Supervisory Board being
able to have legitimate and effective supervisory control over the decisions
of executives and over the Management Board.  The simple structure of
having a board tasked with supervising will not accomplish the kind of
monitoring necessary to stop poor decisions and malfeasance from occur-
ring.  The way information is obtained, analyzed, and utilized is crucial to
improving monitoring and thereby improving outcomes.234
234. See Sharpe, supra note 103, at 1454 (describing the limited channels through which
board members receive information); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Direc-
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CONCLUSION
Volkswagen’s two-tier board structure did not prevent the largest scan-
dal in the automobile industry’s history.  Volkswagen, and other German
corporations, may follow the structural requirements of German corporate
law, but without an effective review and accountability process, the valua-
ble idea of codetermination is never actualized.  Instead, the Supervisory
Board fails in their monitoring and supervisory roles.  They are watchers
asleep at their post, uninformed, dormant, and ineffective in preventing
gross failures of corporate integrity.  Unless, German boards adopt and
implement the Process Oriented Approach, the Volkswagen emission
scandal will simply be another mark on the timeline of a century plagued
by corporate failure and malfeasance.
tor, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 162-64 (2010) (“[I]nformational asymmetries may significantly cur-
tail independent directors’ effectiveness as monitors.”).
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APPENDIX
Volkswagen Board as of September 2015
Affiliation: Porsche-Piëch Family
Ownership in VW: 30.8% indirectly through Porsche Automobil
Holdings SE, 52.2% voting rights via Porsche Automobil Holdings SE1
Ownership in Porsche SE: 50.7% ownership, 100% voting rights2

















Chairman of the Supervisory 
Board of Porsche Automobil 
Holding SE; Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board of Dr. Ing. 
h.c. F. Porsche AG 
7 Unknown (likely large 
via Familie Porsche 















Member of the Board of 
Management of Familie 
Porsche AG 
Beteiligungsgesellschaft 
Years on the board as of 
September 2015: 6 
6 Unknown (likely large 
via Familie Porsche 





Designer and entrepreneur; 
niece of Ferdinand Piëch 









Unknown  Unknown  
1. Shareholder Structure, VOLKSWAGEN, http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vw
corp/content/en/investor_relations/share/Shareholder_Structure.html.
2. The Porsche-Piëch Family holds 100% voting control rights through the privately
owned Familie Porsche Beteiligung GmbH and other private Gmbhs. See Voting Rights An-
nouncement, PORSCHE AUTOMOBIL HOLDING SE (June 2 2016), http://www.dgap.de/link.php
?template=porschenew&a=100&sprache=en&hp_lang=en&von=20100101&typ=pvr,nvr&id
=943785. Volkswagen AG fully owns Porsche AG, the auto making arm of Porsche and a
separate entity from the Porsche Automobil Holding SE holding. Chad Thomas & Dorothee
Tschampa, VW to Pay $5.6 Billion for Rest of Porsche, BLOOMBERG (July 5, 2012), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-04/volkswagen-to-purchase-remaining-porsche-
stake-for-5-6-billion.
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3. Veröffentlichung des Tenors und der wesentlichen Begründung der Bescheide der
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.bafin.de/Shared-
Docs/Downloads/DE/Befreiungsentscheidung/porsche_ua.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1;
See Jack Ewing, Ex-Chairman Has Chance to Shake Up Volkswagen, as a Shareholder, NEW
YORK TIMES (May 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/business/international/ex-
chairman-piech-has-chance-to-shake-up-volkswagen.html.
4. Although ownership of Familie Porsche Beteiligung GmbH is not available pub-
licly, a New Zealand overseas regulatory filing offers some clues as to the ownership before a
family merger in 2014; however, it does not disclose current ownership or controlling shares
during the merger. See Case 201420004 - Familie Porsche Beteiligung GmbH, LAND INFOR-
MATION NEW ZEALAND, (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.linz.govt.nz/regulatory/overseas-invest
ment/decision-summaries-statistics/2014-08/201420004.
5. HMP Vermögensverwaltug GmbH, Moneyhouse (May 8, 2015), https://
www.moneyhouse.de/HMP-Vermoegensverwaltung-GmbH-Muenchen; Veröffentlichung des
Tenors und der wesentlichen Begründung der Bescheide der Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/
DE/Befreiungsentscheidung/porsche_ua.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1.
6. Although ownership of Familie Porsche Beteiligung GmbH is not available pub-
licly, a New Zealand overseas regulatory filing offers some clues as to the ownership before a
family merger in 2014; however, it does not disclose current ownership or controlling shares
during the merger. See Familie Porsche, supra note 4.
7. Noah Joseph, Volkswagen names Piech’s nieces to supervisory board, AUTOBLOG
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.autoblog.com/2015/04/30/volkswagen-supervisory-board-piech-
nieces-official/.
8. Id.
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Affiliation: State of Lower Saxony
Name  Title Years on 





Ownership in VW 
Stephan 
Weil 
Minister-President of the 
Federal State of Lower 
Saxony 
2 n/a, 0% 
voting rights 
11.8% via State of 
Lower Saxony, 20% 
voting rights9 
Olaf Lies Minister of Economic 
Affairs, Labor and 
Transport for the Federal 
State of Lower Saxony 
2 n/a, 0% 
voting rights 
11.8% via State of 
Lower Saxony, 20% 
voting rights10 
Affiliation: Qatar Holdings
Name  Title Years on the 









Minister of State and 
Board Member of Qatar 
Investment Authority 
5 0%, 0% voting 
rights11 




Minister of State and 
Group Chief Executive of 
Qatar Airways 
>1 0%, 0% voting 
rights13 
14.6%, 17% of 
voting rights14 
Employees and Unions of Volkswagen and Subsidiaries
Ownership in VW: n/a, 0% control rights but control through Co-Deter-
mination Laws
Ownership in Porsche SE: n/a, 0% voting rights
9. Shareholder Structure, supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. Qatar Holdings held a 10% stake in Porsche SE until 2013. Dinesh Nair & An-
dreas Cremer Qatar Sells Back 10 Percent Porsche Stake to Founding Families, REUTERS
(June 17, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-porsche-volkswagen-idUSBRE95G0
8E20130617.
12. Shareholder Structure, supra note 1.
13. Qatar Holdings held a 10% stake in Porsche SE until 2013. Nair, supra note 11.
14. Shareholder Structure, supra note 1.
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Honorary Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board of 
Volkswagen AG 
28 n/a n/a Volkswagen 
Berthold 
Huber 
Deputy Chairman (during 
crisis) 
5 n/a n/a IG Metall15 
Hartmut 
Meine  
Director of the Lower 
Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt 
Regional Office of IG 
Metall 
6 n/a n/a IG Metall 
Babette 
Fröhlich  
Department head for 
coordination of Executive 
Board duties and planning 
7 n/a n/a IG Metall 
Jürgen 
Dorn 
Chairman of the Works 
Council at the MAN Truck 
& Bus AG Munich plant, 
Chairman of the General 
Works Council of MAN 
Truck & Bus AG and 
Chairman of the Group 
Works Council and the SE 
Works Council of MAN SE 








Deputy Chairman of the 
General and Group Works 
Councils of Volkswagen AG




Chairman of the Works 
Council of Volkswagen 
Commercial Vehicles 





Chairman of the Board of 
Management of Volkswagen 
Management Association 
2 n/a n/a Volkswagen 
Uwe 
Fritsch  
Chairman of the Works 
Council at the 
Volkswagen AG 
Braunschweig plant 




Chairman of the General 
and Group Works Councils 
of Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche 
AG 
1< n/a n/a Porsche AG 
Peter 
Mosch 
Chairman of the General 
Works Council of AUDI 
AG 
9 n/a n/a Audi AG 
Bernd 
Osterloh 
Chairman of the General 
and Group Works Councils 
of Volkswagen AG 
10 n/a n/a VW Work 
Councils 
15. A large German union. See IG Metall https://www.igmetall.de/0161455_Leistungen
_Aug2008_gesamt_Englisch_28c4f7286cd82fa03678012a851a6f0c8131a413.pdf.
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Affiliation: Independent/Institutional Investors
Ownership in VW: 42.8% ownership across all institutional and foreign
investors, 10.8% control rights
Ownership in Porsche SE: n/a, 0% control rights
Name  Title Years on the 








President and Group Chief 
Executive of Skandinaviska 
Enskilda Banken AB 
4 n/a n/a 
Below: a summary of the indirect ownership of VW16
16. Bilderstrecke zu: Familien Porsche und Piëch: So verteilt sich die Macht bei Volk-
swagen, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/familien-porsche-
und-piech-so-verteilt-sich-die-macht-bei-volkswagen-13559209/die-familien-piech-und-pors
che-13544086.html.
